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 John Perry Barlow’s two essays capture a yearning to escape the 
oppressive clutches of the two most important institutional forms in 
modernity: the state and market society.  A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace is explicitly against the modern state.  One 
might say, “All right, but apart from the sanitation, the medicine, 
education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system, and 
public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?”1  The 
Declaration reflected not only a libertarian utopia that assumed that if 
only the state were to back off markets will take care of it all, but also a 
left-anchored critique of the state as a critical site of protecting the power 
and privilege of elites, insistence that individual self-actualization 
demanded a state contained within narrow boundaries, and a deep 
skepticism of all forms of authority, as Fred Turner showed in From 
Counterculture to Cyberculture.2  Selling Wine Without Bottles is not 
against markets or payment as such, but rather a resistance to the 
totalizing vision of commodity exchange as all there is.  In this, for me a 
telling passage was:  
[M]ost of what a middle class American purchases has little to do 
with survival. We buy beauty, prestige, experience, education, and 
all the obscure pleasures of owning. Many of these things can not 
only be expressed in non-material terms, they can be acquired by 
non-material means.  
And then there are the inexplicable pleasures of information 
itself, the joys of learning, knowing, and teaching. The strange good 
feeling of information coming into and out of oneself. Playing with 
ideas is a recreation which people must be willing to pay a lot for, 
given the market for books and elective seminars. We’d likely 
spend even more money for such pleasures if there weren’t so many 
opportunities to pay for ideas with other ideas.  
This explains much of the collective “volunteer” work which 
fills the archives, newsgroups, and databases of the Internet. Its 
denizens are not working for “nothing,” as is widely believed. 
 
1 MONTY PYTHON’S LIFE OF BRIAN (Sony Pictures 1979). 
2 FRED TURNER, FROM COUNTERCULTURE TO CYBERCULTURE (2006). 
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Rather they are getting paid in something besides money. It is an 
economy which consists almost entirely of information.3  
 Here was the nub of it.  An ambition to live in spaces where the 
commodity form was not everything.  Where we could produce with and 
for each other in relations of social exchange.  The problem was not so 
much markets as markets.  It was the totalizing sense that markets are all 
there is.  Nothing captured this so clearly at the time than the battles over 
music copyright, where the Recording Industry Association of America’s 
(RIAA) vision of a celestial jukebox meant that music was a relationship 
that should be fully mediated by money, down to the briefest moments of 
pleasure or cultural reference.  The position that Barlow presented here, 
widely shared by many of us who worked to theorize and practically 
construct the public domain, was a vision that music was a social 
relationship and that markets had to be cabined alongside a robust 
commons-based cultural production.   
 I spent much of the last twenty-five years focused primarily on 
the latter of the two problems—the extent of the market and how we can 
escape its totalizing reach.  Only occasionally, and quite late in my own 
work, did I turn to how we think about how we counter the oppressive 
potential of the state without losing the benefits of its ability to deliver 
public goods, contain market power, and redistribute wealth.   
 As I was preparing for the oddly introspective exercise of writing 
my contribution here, I dug up an August 1995 draft of the job talk with 
which I tried to persuade law schools to hire me.  I opened with this: 
Recognizing this historical moment presents us with a rare instance 
at which we can make choices about the architecture of the new 
technological base upon which our society and economy will be 
built. Choices we make now will affect investment and use patterns, 
which in turn will further affect the paths along which technology 
itself will develop, and will affect how we conceive of information 
and knowledge, and how we produce and consume that information 
and knowledge. The network architecture and the patterns of use of 
electronic communications that will develop from these choices will 
have significant effects on our cultural, social, and economic 
structure. 
And then closed with: 
Because the attributes of digital communications technology have 
the potential to effect profound changes in the way we interact with 
 
3 John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottes: The Economy of Mind on the 
Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 23–24 (2019). 
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one another, the stakes of how we regulate the networks through 
which we will interact are very high. We could move ourselves 
towards a society in which the production and consumption of 
information and knowledge is decentralized and diversified, 
emphasizing those attributes of digital technology that make 
possible nonhierarchical, open communications available on a 
more-or-less equal basis to all end users. We could also move our 
society towards a centralized economy, in which a few large 
information conglomerates have such fine-tuned information about 
our preferences, powers, and vulnerabilities, that they can exert a 
tremendous amount of control over our every choice. We will likely 
move towards something that is neither Cybertopia nor Orwell’s 
dystopia.  But where along the spectrum from phobia to utopia our 
society will actually end up will likely be affected by accumulated 
choices we make today and tomorrow about who controls the 
various components and aspects of the communications 
infrastructure upon which our information society will be built. That 
is where legislators, judges, and lawyers come in, for in every legal 
decision, regulatory action, or law that effects an institutional 
determination about who controls which resources that are pertinent 
to the development of the electronic communications network, a 
piece of our future is being determined. 
Plus ça change.  
 In the 1990s, the particular institutional battle over power to 
control the information economy and society were battles over the scope 
of commons. I thought that the most important choices would be about 
property and commons—in particular how building robust commons 
could provide a steady resource base on which decentralized, self-
governing communities and individuals could construct a robust system 
of information, communications, knowledge, and cultural production that 
was not dependent on market relations and could provide a measure of 
freedom from powerful market actors, as well as from the state. 
 The primary failure of that vision was that except in important 
isolated settings, where commons-based practices took root early and 
were able to outcompete the state and the market, expansion of the 
domain of nonmarket production has stalled. 
 The fundamental battle that I think Barlow insisted we join, and 
that I too focused on, was the right battle for its time.  It continues to be 
the case that battles over the shape of property rights and technological 
affordances will shape bargaining power within markets, and will shape 
the existence and relative prevalence or importance of non-market forms 
of production and social exchange.  It’s still the case that in principle, as 
we project twenty-five years forward, we might be in a world in which a 
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core set of basic materials is pumped into our homes as electricity and 
water are, and feed distributed fabricators (3D printers) become as 
ubiquitous as laundry machines or microwaves.  Such a system would 
allow us to share designs as free and open source software (FOSS), user 
innovation, or fan fiction are shared today, and to fabricate much of the 
stuff we need in non-commodified, household production for our own 
use and to share and exchange with others.  No one has captured the 
potential for such a non-commodified society like Cory Doctorow in 
Walkaway.  It’s still the case that the pattern of control over energy 
generation could shift toward a distributed system, as solar panels and 
wind turbines get connected over a neutral, public grid.  It’s still the case 
that services that depend on platforms could be structured as 
cooperatives.  Whether any of these developments will emerge will 
depend in large measure on what institutional choices we make about the 
technology and about how it is used in actual institutional settings and 
firms. It will depend on whether this time (unlike in the 1990s), we will 
succeed in seeing a population-level cultural change from people 
perceiving themselves as consumers to people seeing themselves as 
producers.  And it will depend on whether we can integrate that shift into 
our day to day practice as a revised view of the state and the market, 
rather than as a displacement. 
 And there’s the rub.  Because the kind of optimism that typified 
Barlow’s writing, as well as at least some of my own, is much harder to 
sustain now that we’ve seen how the successes of the first generation of 
battles over the commons have turned out.   
 Facebook runs over TCP/IP and WiFi.  The fact that the 
underlying carrier technology and the Internet Protocol are open access 
commons turned out not to have been enough to preserve people’s 
freedom from the power of a small number of corporations.  Both on the 
consumer end, like Roku, and on the cloud services side, Linux is 
everywhere.  The Internet of Things could not run on anything other than 
FOSS and spectrum commons.  And yet, these devices are all centrally 
controlled, and many function as the sensors for pervasive surveillance 
systems.  Just as industrial manufacturers cheerfully emitted pollutants 
and effluents into the commons of the air and water to externalize some 
of their costs, so too are Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple finding 
ways of constructing new bottlenecks above and below the open layers, 
creating new toll booths and points of observation,4 and using the “free” 
nature of the open parts of the infrastructure as low cost input from 
 
4 See generally Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145 
DAEDALUS 18 (2016). 
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which to then mine our “biopolitical public domain,” as Julie Cohen puts 
it.5 
 What the past quarter century has taught us is that there are five 
basic failure modes of commons-based strategies to construct more 
attractive forms of social relations. 
1. Companies and countries can usually sustain focused 
strategic efforts for longer and more actively than 
distributed networks of users.  They can and do use these 
advantages strategically to re-centralize control over 
consumers and voters using mechanisms that are layered 
over or circumvent the still-open parts of the ecosystem.  
This is not true in all cases; Wikipedia has enough 
activated users that they are able to overcome concerted 
efforts to distort information; major FOSS development 
projects of core pieces of infrastructure beat out proprietary 
solutions.  But, as Wikipedia approaches its 20th 
anniversary, we have to recognize that these major 
examples of successful distributed commons-based social 
production continue to be our prime examples.  Time and 
again over the past twenty years we have seen companies 
spending money to harness relatively passive consumers—
whether it is in carrier-operated WiFi networks that 
completely overshadowed the emergence of community 
wireless networks, or whether it is in the App economy that 
Apple introduced, based on the App Store model, that 
increasingly has displaced for most people the open-
standards based personal computer running an open-
standards based html browser.  And in the past five years 
we have seen countries find ways of using the open nature 
of communications to engage in propaganda and 
manipulation, as well as to track dissidents and opponents 
by tapping into the surveillance capabilities that companies 
developed to continuously gather information about their 
users for commercial sale.  
2. Distributed social relations can themselves develop internal 
hierarchies and inequities (the Iron Law of Oligarchy), as 
current debates over Wikipedia and FOSS gender 
participation ratios and governance make clear. 
 
5 See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal 
Construction of the Surveillance Economy, 31 PHILOSOPHY & TECH. 213 (2018). 
83                        A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UTOPIA? [Vol. 18 																																																						
 
3. Distributed open communications have provided enormous 
play for genuinely hateful and harmful behavior, such that 
we find ourselves seeking some power to control the worst 
abuses—the power of the platforms we want to hold 
democratically accountable, or the power of countries to 
regulate those platforms for us.  As early as Gamergate, 
when networked gamers mobilized to harass and intimidate 
women: game developers and media critics, in the name of 
geek masculinity and free speech, and more prominently 
since the various elections of 2016, we have come to 
appreciate the extent to which fully distributed networks 
can underwrite abusive behavior. 
4. More fundamentally, as long as we live in a society where 
people have to make money to eat and keep a roof over 
their heads, markets produce stuff we really like and want.  
For all the broad complaints about Amazon, it has 
produced enormous consumer welfare.  More directly, for 
all the romanticization of fan videos and remix, the 
emergence of subscription streaming services like Netflix 
and Amazon Prime has been a boon to professional video 
creators and underwritten a golden age of professional 
video entertainment and narrative, both fiction and non-
fiction.   
5. States are still necessary to counter market power, provide 
public goods on a sustained and large-scale basis by using 
coercive taxing and spending powers, redistribute wealth, 
and provide basic social and economic security for the 
majority of the population. 
 Markets and states have proved remarkably resilient and 
adaptive.  Even where technological standards and institutions made it 
possible for commons-based, distributed action to take root, both market 
actors and states have found ways to impose their goals on most of the 
population.  This occurred primarily when the population engaging with 
technology shifted from the more active and technically capable early 
adopters to encompass a broader range of users, most of whom couldn’t, 
or didn’t care to, use the freedoms that early adopters had put in place for 
themselves.  In part, this “domestication” of user creativity was done as a 
sustained, intentional campaign, like the RIAA and MPAA’s litigation 
and legislation campaign against remix culture in favor of the celestial 
jukebox.  In part, it may simply reflect the diversity of motivation among 
human beings and the prevalence of the culture of passive consumption 
when it is available.  Perhaps there simply are more sheep than cats.   
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 Beyond the simple fact that market and state actors re-emerged 
as central sources of power, states in particular seem to present a much 
more likely source of accountable power and counteracting force to 
market-based power than was the prevailing sense among both left- and 
right-libertarians in the 1990s.  A resurgent progressive movement is 
fighting hard to change the basic narrative on how important it is to 
harness the state, accountably and democratically, to play its core roles.   
 So this, to me, is the great challenge facing those of us who still 
want to think of technological change in terms of its effects on social 
relations.  We need a clearer and more fully articulated political economy 
of technology.  We need a better understanding of what the state and the 
market are for, in the context of a genuine three-way interaction between 
state, market, and commons-based production specifically or social, 
nonmarket production more generally.  And we need to internalize the 
limits of anarchism, whether of the right or left spin.  I see present 
debates over blockchain, cryptocurrencies, and re-decentralizing the net, 
and I see in them a rededication to the ideals that Barlow expressed so 
poetically.  The words are still there, but the music seems out of sync 
with the beat of the times.  
